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1 .  Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to give an explanation for the definiteness effect 
(DE) that arises with attributive comparative constructions .  The DE in 
comparatives seems to have been noticed only as recently as in  (Lerner and 
Pinkal 1 995) . For an i l lustrat ion , consider the contrast between examples ( 1 )  
and ( 2 ) .  While ( 1 )  i s  fine, ( 2 )  i s  a t  least odd i f  not ungrammatical . 
( 1 ) Al ate a bigger piece of cake than Sue (did ) . 
( 2 )  # AI a t e  every bigger piece of  cake than Sue  (did) . 
As with other environments that exhibit a definiteness effect or a definiteness 
restriction , as for instance there be sentences , deft or pseudodcft construction 
etc . (cf. Higginbotham ( 1 987) for a list ) , the DE in attributive comparatives 
arises with all types of strong comparative NPs,  i . e .  comparat ive NPs that 
contain a strong determiner ,  e . g .  a I I n iversal determiner , a definit.e artic le ,  a 
part i t ive determiner etc .  
(3 )  
{ most 
# AI ate the 
two of the 
} bigg" pi"ee (,) of cake thau Sue (d id ) . 
In contrast , comparative l\Ps with a weak determiner as an indefinite article 
or determiner ,  a (modified) nllmerical determiner etc. are fine .  
(4 )  
{ a  few/many 
some 
Al ate 
(exact  Iy)  two 
at most/ least t \\"o 
} bigg'" pi,,,,,, of "ak,> tbau SUl (d id ) .  
Lerner and Pinkal ( 1 995 )  c lai m that the DE is dependent 011 the explicit 
occurn�nce of a comparative complement. .  They motivate their claim with 
examples as the following. 
( 5 ) George owns every/the faster car. ( the i r  ( 32 )  ane! ( :33 ) )  
I\ote ,  however, that al though t h e  DE apppars to be dependent on an  explicit 
occurrence of a comparat ive comp\Pll ent ,  th is does not mean that the presence 
of it complement is a s u ffic ient cond i t ion for the D E .  Consider t h e  fol lowing 
example cluster with strong comparative NPs and a complement :  
(6 )  Al ate every/the/most bigger piece (s )  of cake than th i s  ol le .  
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Moreover, i t  is disputable whether the complement less comparative does not 
show the DE in general . Although a comparative that is lacking a complement 
does not give a comparison instancel explicit ly, i t  is nonetheless required 
for the interpretation of the comparative clause . For both weak and strong 
comparative NPs that lack a complement , some comparison instance has to 
be  provided for in the context .  On this view , one may suspect that the 
particular way in which an instance is contextually given may have an effect 
similar to the DE on the contextual coherence of a comparative sentence .  
This is witnessed by the differences in acceptabi l i ty of the following sentence 
pairs . 
(7)  Of those cars, Sue bought one. George bought every faster car . 
(8 )  Sue bought a c a r .  # George bought every faster car. 
(9) Sue bought a car. George bought a faster car. 
Intuitively, the difference between (7) and (8) is that ,  in (7) ,  a distinguished 
element in a given set of instances, namely the ins tance given by Sue's car , 
faci l itates to determine the denotation of every faster car on the basis of the 
given set of cars. Contrastingly, the first sentence in  ( 8 )  only renders available 
some comparison instance without a definite set from which i t  is taken . The 
lack of a contextually given set of comparison instances doesn ' t  seem to matter 
in (9 ) , where the comparative NP is weak. 
The structure of the paper is as follows . In sedion 2 . ,  I argue that com­
parative adjectives have particular contextual properties which show certain 
similarities to presuppositions. The notion of a comparison set i s  introduced 
and motivated . Section 3 .  reviews a promising approach to the D E  in general 
by rvlo l tmann ( 1 996) . An analysis of the differences between weak and strong 
NPs is given in terms of domain presupposi t ion . Section 4. and 5 .  provide 
a proposal for the logical form of the comparat ive NP and the complement . 
Section 6. gives an account of the DE in attributive comparatives on the basis 
of the analys is in sections 4. and 5 . . Finally, section 7. adds an outl ine of my 
view about the resolution of various forms of comparative ell ipsis .  
2 .  Presupposit ion- like propert ies of comparat ives 
Before attempting a formalization of the semantics of attributive comparat ive 
constructions, I motivate the above claim that the presence of a comparison 
instance is a contextual requirement for the interpret at ion of comparatives. 
Consider the scapegoat assumption that the comparison instance is seman­
t ically part of the assertion of a comparat ive . Then , one might expect a 
comparat ive without complement to pattern l ike constructions that are as­
sumed to have implicit arguments that c a n be inferred on the basis of their 
function 's specification . Take for instance the intrans i t ive Sue ate,  where an 
unspecified theme, though missing , is an implicit part of the assertion and , 
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therefore, can be inferred :  there has to be something Sue ate when i t  is the 
c ase that she ate .  Since implic it  arguments are constitut ing parts of the as­
sertion , the inferences that can be drawn on the basis of such an argument 
depends on the assertion as a whole. If, for example ,  an assertion has the 
form of a negation,  the inferences drawn on the basis of an implicit argument 
are not the same as those of the corresponding posit ive assertion . Sue didn 't  
eat does not entai l  that there is something Sue did not eat . Returning to the 
complementless comparative , we observe that the information that there has 
to  be an implicit comparison instance survives particular properties of the as­
sert ion .  The fol lowing examples are examples for the common presupposition 
tests of negation and counterfactual condit ionals respectively. 
( 1 0 )  Sue didn ' t  eat a bigger piece of cake. 
( 1 1 )  If Sue ate a bigger piece of cake, she would be contrite . 
For an assertion of ( 1 0 )  to be fel ic itous ,  there has to be  some piece of cake 
or ,  more cautiously, some somehow sized object that serves as the compari­
son instance . Likewise for ( 1 1 ) .  Thus ,  the instance obeys the presupposition 
tests . Further, i f  the comparative complement i s  a means to express such an 
instance, its interpretation should be immune to  the particular environment i t  
occurs in .  This  means we do not expect any effect on the comparison instance 
when a comparative NP with complement occurs in a n egation or in  a condi­
tional . Since, for reasons of possible scope interactions, conditionalizing is the 
more reliable presupposition test , we confine ourselves to the following.  
( 1 2 )  I f  Sue ate a bigger piece of cake than AI ,  she would be contrite .  
Here , the contextually required instance is in  some way related t.o  AI.  Neither 
the requirement for such an instance nor its being related to Al  is affected by 
the fact that the comparat. ive clause occurs in the antece(\fmt of the condi­
t ional .  
Another hypothesis about the status of the complement is that i t  mod­
i fies the comparative noun or NP, i . e .  i t  is semantically a function on N or 
NP denotations comparable, for i nstance , to relat ive clauses or NP modifying 
PPs. Again ,  counterevidence can be drawn from their behaviour in presup­
position tests. The information of m odifiers l i ke PPs or relative clauses does 
not surv ive i n  con d i t ionals .  For ( 1 3 )  and ( 14) , i t  is not required that Al made 
a cake and t h at there is a coconut cake, respect ively. 
( 1 3 ) If Sue would eat a cake Al made,  she wouldn ' t  l i ke i t .  
( 14 )  If Sue  would eat a cake w i t h  c o c o  Hakes , she  would have a n  al lergic fi t .  
A s  has been claimed in the introduction , I take t h e  above considerat ions as 
evidence that the presence of a complement is a means to identify a subset i n  a 
possibly bigger set of contextually available comparison instances rather than 
to  assert the instance itself. Before g iv ing an explication of  t h i s  I introduce a 
promising analysis of the DE in general and examine the DE i l l  comparatives 
more closely. 
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3 .  The definiteness effect as  a discourse-related phenomenon 
The definiteness effect in  there be sentences received by far the most attention 
in the l iterature .  Apart from the problem of the particular semantics of th ere 
be,  the main question concerned the characteristics of the NPs acceptable i n  
there be constructions. 
( 1 5 ) There is  a/at least one/no sparrow on the roof. 
( 1 6 ) #There is every/the sparrow on the roof. 
The examination of the logical properties of determ iners in NPs provided 
the means for a descriptive generalization :  NPs acceptable i n  there be con­
structions have a determiner that is intersective .  In  order to determine the 
denotation of a NP contain ing an intersective determiner one only needs to 
know the intersection of its two arguments. We take the respective defin it ion 
from Keenan ( 1 996) (for the further ,  call D's  first argument the domain of D 
and the second argument its scope ) : 
D f  1 .  A determiner D is intersective iff for any sets A ,  B, A' ,  B' � V :  
A n B = A' n B' =:} D (A) (B) = D (A' ) (B' )  
Another problem concerns the  explanation of  why only NPs  with intersective 
determiners and not others are subject to the DE.  A promising approach to 
such an explanation is given in (l'vloltmann 1 996 ) , who rather focusses on 
the characteristics of NPs not acceptable in constructions that give rise to 
a DE. Before giving a synopsis of Moltman n 's arguments, let me add some 
motivation from the logical characteristics of NPs subject to a DE. As regards 
unacceptable, simple NPs ,  i . e .  :\"Ps containing j ust a lexical determiner ,  the 
relevant propert.y of the determiner seems to be what has been classified as 
co-intersect i  vi  ty :  
D f  2 .  A determiner D is co-intersect ive iff· for any sets A , B ,  A' , B' � V :  
A - B = A' - B' =:} D (A) (B) = D (A' ) (B' )  
Drawing from the  part icular set-theoret. ic operat. ion used in the definitions of  
intersect ive and co-intersect ive determiners respect ively, an  important mini­
mal d ifference can be shown with conservat iv i ty of D : 
Thm 1 .  All intersect ive det.erminers D are sYlIlmetr ic :  
for any .4 , B � V : D ( A) (B ) = D (B) (A) from Df 1 
=:} D (A) (B ) = D(A n B) (A n B )  with conservativity 
Thm 2 .  Co-intersect ive determiners D are not symmetri c (for I V I 2: 1 ) :  
there are A , B � U :  D (A) (B ) j D (B) (A ) from Df 2 
=:} D (A) (B) = D (A) (A n B) with conservativity 
The respective bottom l i llf�s show the famil iar fact that co-intersective (strong) 
determiners are dependent on their domain ' s  definition while intersective 
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(weak ) determiners are not . For a ;\IP with a co- intersective determiner ,  
one has to know what A is in order to determine the denotation of the NP. 
Now, Moltmann claims that this logical property of co-intersective s imple de­
terminers is a reflex of a general contextual requirement for non-intersective 
quantifiers2 : 
(DP) Domain P resupposit ion Thesis ( i\Ioltmann 1 996 ,  p . 4 ) : 
Non-intersective (strong) quantifiers always presuppose their domain .  
Crucial ly, domain presupposition is no t  only that the  domain of  a strong 
quantifier be non-empty but that the domain set is given by the previous con­
text . Preeminent support for the claim that strong quantifiers carry a domain 
presupposition comes from the analysis of NPs that contain event-dependent 
modifiers such as n e ll", other or first .  A further property of those modifiers , 
somewhat neglected in ( :Yloltmann 1 996) , is that t hey assert a property of 
an individual on the background of a contextually given comparison c lass: in 
order to characterihe someth ing as n c w, other or firs t ,  one h as to determine 
with respect to what comparison class it is so character ihed . I account for 
this fact by the following logical form for the respective modifiers :  
( 1 7) new ==? )"'P AXP(X) 1\ new' ( .]; ,  X) 
P i s  t.he property to be determined by the noun ;  t. h e  comparison class is a set 
X that  has to be context ually determined (one might add a constraint. that 
X C;:: P) . 
In  th is l ight ,  of p a rticular inte!'(�st a r e  the read ings in which the de­
term inat ion of the  comparison set is i n  some way dependen t 011 the event 
described by the verb of the c:lause the modifier occurs in. Consider the fol­
lowing contrast i n  availab le readings for a sentence contain ing a weak NP 
the domain of which is modified by new i n  ( 1 8 ) ,  and one with a respect ively 
modified strong NP in ( 1 9 ) .  
( 1 8 ) J o h n  used a/at least one/no new pen .  
a .  Joh n  lIsed a p en he reeent.ly a.cqui red . 
( lVlol tmann 's (5a ) ) 
b .  J o h n  lI�ed a pcn d i fferent. fro I l l  the  O J l ('S  he l I sed b e fore .  
( 1 9 )  John used e\,pry/the  n e w  p e n .  
(1. . John used every pen he recen t ly acquired . 
( l'vloltmann ' s  ( 1 0 ) )  
b .  # John used every p e n  different. froIII t h e  ones he used before . 
.vlol t.mann describes the contrast as follows. ( 1 8 )  is acceptable on a reading 
that involves a comparison class to b e  det.ermined rel ative to "an event of t.he 
same type a s  [ t.he event described by the sent.ence]" , while ( 1 9) ,  with a st.rong 
cleterminer w i th a respectively mod ified domai n ,  is not . It. i s  an intricate 
problem what. "all event of th e same type" i s  s u p p osed t o  mean here. Let me 
suppress t.he d iscussion the avalanche of problell ls  for it s exa c t  ch aract erization 
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and assume that it i s  not an unsurmountable task.  In the following logical 
form that is meant to capture the reading ( ISb) , i t  is rather unspecifically 
represented by the relation symbol R. (A  standard characterization of an event 
consists of an event description with an event variable as its first argument and 
the thematic role fillers as further arguments, e .g .  used (e ) (penx ) (j ) .  Deviating 
from Moltmann 's  suggestion ,  I prefer to locate the event dependence of the 
modifiers in the determination of the comparison set . A notational reflex is  
the annotation of Xe rather than having an additional event argument for the 
modifier . )  
(20)  3e : used (e) (penx /\ ncw (x ,  Xe) ) (j )  
where X. = {x : x E PEN /\ 3eiR(e ,  ei ) /\ THEME (x ,  ei ) }  
The comparison class i s  a set defined by the individuals that are both a pen 
and the theme3 of some event of ei of the samc type of e .  What i s  crucial in the 
l ight of the following is that the comparison set may be  entered into the scope 
of the existent ial event quantifier since it is part of a non-quantificational , 
weak NP. Thus, the event index of X. is bound and the comparison set 
can indeed be determined with respect to the event description to which the 
modified NP contributes. Why does this not work for quantificational ,  strong 
�Ps? The answer involves two related considerations why the NP as a whole 
canIlot be properly interpreted on the background of a given context . 
Assuming the standard treatment of quantificational NPs as quantify­
ing into the scope domain of a (minimal) event , we would arr ive at a logical 
form as follows (suppressing the definition of Xe ) . 
( 2 1 )  \fx [ [penx /\ new (x , X. ) ] -+ 3c used (e ) ( .'E ) (j ) 
Here , the problem is the unbound event variable of Xe .  The comparison set 
has to be determined on the basis of some e that , as a free variable ,  cannot 
be evaluated outside the the scope of the event description of the verb . 1  
If, on the other hand , we allow non-standardly for a logical form as 
in ( 1 9) ,  we find that the domain presuppos i t ion of every n e w  p en cannot be 
sat isfied when the comparison set i s  to be defined with  respect to t.he event .  
( 22 )  3e\fx [ [penx /\ new (l: , Xe ) ] -+ used (e ) (x) (j ) ] 
The domain presupposition requires that [penx /\ new (x ,  Xe ) ] be  determined 
with respect to the previous context . Conflict ingly, the  determination of the 
comparison set within the domain of the strong NP depends on the event de­
scribed il l the current sentence .  Thus, the restr ict ion new pen cannot be eva l ­
uated outside the scope of the event quantifier ,  contrary to what i s required by 
its domain presupposit ion . Conc: l lld ing th is  excurs ion on Molt.mann ' s  notioll 
of domain presupposi t ion , I return to the DE in comparat ives . 
There is an obvious parallel between event-dependent. modifiers and 
the r.omparative adjective i n  attributive comparatives. Apart from being noun 
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modifiers, both kinds of expressions relate an individual to some comparison 
instance that is defined either with respect to the sentence they occur in or 
on the basis of the previous context . Both the thing compared and the com­
parison instance have to be  taken from a suitable comparison set . An obvious 
difference concerning the determination of the respective comparison instance 
and the comparison set is that , i n  attributive comparatives , it cannot be taken 
as dependent on the particular event description in which the comparative 
l\ P  occurs. For instance, when Al asked for a bigger piece of cake ( than 
any of those in the display case ) , i t  is  not his request (the "ask-for" -event) 
that helps deciding what comparison set is meant . Moreover, the possibi l ity 
for a complement provides us with a different device than event-dependency 
for determining elements, i . e .  comparison instances , in a comparison set . In 
the following two sections , I provide the details for how the different factors 
in  a comparative influence the identification of a comparison instance and a 
comparison set . 
4 .  Analysis o f  t he comparat ive NP 
Consider the fol lowing examp le of an  attributive comparat ive without com­
plement : 
(23)  Sue had a piece of cake, and Al had a bigger piece of cake . 
In section 2 . ,  I motivated that a comparat ive depends on a contextually given 
comparison instance from a com parison set . Let 's prel iminarily account for 
this by the following logical form for the comparat ive adject ive . 
(24)  bigger ===> )"N)..:c .N (x)  1\ x > big a where a, x E e[NJ 
The comparative adjective is a nOlln modifier ,  i . e .  a function that takes a noun 
denotation N into a property of individuals .  The property is characterized 
as being comparatively related to some contextually given individual a.  The 
comparative relation > big m ay be part either of the lexical specification of 
a gradable adjective or of the comparative morpheme -er (d. Klein ( 1 9 9 1 )  
for a discussion of d i fferent approaches) .  I t  wil l  be defined as a relat ion  
among clemen ts of the sortal  range of a grad able  exprestiion that sat isfies t h e  
fol l owing axiom sche mata ( from (Hoeksema 1 983) ) .  The two ax i oms suffice 
to characterize each > 0 as a str ict part ial order. 
(A I ) Vx ,  y , z [x > 0 Y -+ [.T > 0 Z V Z > 0 yJ ] 
(A2)  V.T , y [:c > " y -+ JJ f o  :1;J 
( almost-connectedness) 
(asym metry ) 
In th is paper ,  I deliberately avoid to refer to degrees, extents, standards or  
similar notions usually used i n  the analysis of comparative construct ions .  I t  
doesn ' t  seem to be necessary to postulate other types of entit ies than individ­
uals (that may be collected into sets) for the analysis of plain comparatives . 
Plain means that the compara t ive is not further modified hy degree modifiers 
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as for instance much or three times in a much bigger piece or a three times 
faster car. It can be shown that ,  on the basis of the above axioms, an analysis 
of plain comparatives that makes use of, for inst.ance, degrees is reducible to 
a corresponding analysis that doesn ' t  (see Klein ( 1 99 1 )  for details) . An ob­
vious practical consideration to avoid reference to degrees is that the logical 
forms will be much easier to read when we don ' t  have to worry about degree 
predicates, degree quantifiers etc .  In the fol lowing, I only mention degrees or 
standards when it  seems to be  commanded by specific constructions. 
(24) adds the constraint on both the comparison instance a and the 
things compared t.hat they be  taken from a certain comparison class. In  
the case of at.tributive comparatives , I assume that the comparison class i s  
determined by the noun interpretation . Consider the above example for i l ­
lustrat ion: i t. does not  make sense to take into consideration t.he t.wo salient 
individuals, namely Sue and the cake she had , when we compare the size 
of the piece of cake Al had . Now,  somewhat unspecific ally, the set. c[N] in 
(24) should be taken to be the set of things that are both N and part of the 
current contextual universe . P robably this is t.oo strong of a requirement for 
the determination of a comparison c lass as witnessed for instance by exam­
ples l ike ( 25 ) , where the property of the thing compared and the property 
of the comparison instance are of a common kind , e.g. automotive means of 
transport . 
(25 )  Sue owns a pretty fast motorbike , b u t  Al owns a faster car .  
Although it remains an open problem , how exact. ly a comparison set may be 
determined by a variety of context.ual factors, I take it for granted that.  the 
interpretation of the noun in an attributive comparative contributes to i t.s 
determination.  
Let me return to the question of the comparison instance .  I t  is not 
quite correct ,  to define the required comparison instance as a contextual ly 
salient individual in the sortal range of the comparative adjective. Often , we 
find several possible comparison instances .  Take the following: 
(26) Al didn ' t  l ike any piece of cake on display. He ordered a bigger piece . 
(26)  tells us two things :  ( i )  it is possible to have a set of comparison in­
stances rather than just a single individual comparison instance; and ( i i ) , the 
comparative relation is stated with respect to any element in this set of in­
stances . Given that a single individual comparison instance can be viewed as 
a singleton set , we can revise the logical form in  (24) as follows. 
( 27) faster ==> )"NAT .N (.T )  /\ Vy E X : .T > rast 11 
where X <::;; e[N] and :r E e [N] 
The universal quant.ification over the elements of X guarantees that the thing 
compared is i l l  t.he comparative relation to each one of them. Since the com­
parison i nstance has been revised t.o be a set . X, the constraint on  X has to 
be revised accordingly: X has to  be a subset. of the comparison set e[N] . 
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A minor revision has to be added in order to facil itate the composition 
when the comparative has a complement . In (28) , the set constant  X has 
been replaced by a set variable X that ranges over some set of comparison 
instances. In case there is a complement , i t  will be the second argument of 
the comparat ive adjective .  
(28 )  faster � )"N)"X)..x .N (x) 1\ \/ y  E X : x > fast Y] 
where X � c[N] and x E e[N] 
For the  fol lowing, (28) will be our logical form for the comparat ive adj ective. 
The composition of a complement less comparative NP is standard.  F irst , the 
comparatives adj ective combines with a noun via function applicat ion .  In case 
there is no complement , the comparative NP's determiner combines with the 
resulting relation between the property of comparison instances and individu­
als via function composit ion.  The logical form of an entire comparat ive clause 
without complement will then be an abstraction over properties of compar­
ison instances, which has to be satisfied by a contextually given set . This 
concludes the discussion of the comparative NP. In the next section , I discuss 
the contribution of the complement to the determination of the comparison 
instance. 
5. A nalysis of the complement 
I turn to hypotactic comparatives first . The main example wil l  be the follow­
ing. 
(29)  Al ate a bigger piece of cake than Sue ate .  
Let  me start with a syntactic observation .  I t  has been argued that there is 
syntactic evidence to treat the comparative complement s imi lar to  indirect 
questions. Among other syntactic evidences (see Klein ( 1 99 1 )  for a sum­
mary and l iterature ) , it is noted by Chomsky ( 1 977) that ,  in non-standard 
English , predicative comparative constru ct ions may have the form of overt 
\Vh-constructions. 
(30) I am taller than what you are . 
German dialects lend further support to this observation . Here ,  the comple­
ment may take the form of a how-question rather than a wha t-quest ion .  To 
witness, compare a l i terary example by Heinrich Heine ( the  fact that  it is an 
equative rather than a comparative can be neglected ; the phenomenon can 
be found in  e i ther construction ) .  
( 3 1 )  [ . . . ] deren Grossmut ist s o  gross als wie das Loch del' Annenbiichs ' .  
' their generosity i s  as big as how the hole o f  the collecting box' 
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I fol low a proposal by Lerner and Pinkal ( 1 995) , who assume, generaliz­
ing the observation for predicative comparatives, that the syntax of tlJan­
complements involves an implicit wh-operator in both predicative and at­
tributive comparatives. The different forms of wh-complements give rise to 
the question how exactly the wh-complement is to be analysed semantically, 
i . e .  what semantics the implicit wll-operator ought to be  assigned . There ap­
pear to be two possible options , i l lustrated by the following paraphrases of 
(29 ) . 
(32)  Al  ate a bigger piece of cake than what Sue did . 
(33) Al ate a bigger piece of cake than how big pieces of cake Sue d id .  
(32)  seems to suggest that what the complement asks for is a set of things, 
while the complement in (33) takes the form of what one may classify as 
a degree question . Is there a way t.o account for the two options for wh­
complements in a unified analysis? I think there is .  Let me refer to an idea 
in (Heim 1987) concerning the analysis of specific-nonspecific ambiguities in 
wha t-questions. Heim argues that. wha t-quest ions interpreted non-specifically 
can be  analysed as involving a (narrow scope ) occurrence of ' something of k ind 
x' .  In analogy, we might interp ret the what-paraphrase i ll (32 ) as involving an 
occurrence of ' something of kind :/: ' and assume that the degree interrogat ive 
ill (33 )  realizes a particular instantiation of the kind x i n  question .  Since the 
postulated wh-operator in the syntactic analysis of the comparative comple­
IIlent is an implicit operator, I t.hink it is not necessary to  insist on a particular 
instantiaton as long as it is not explicitly required by the question predicate 
( i . e .  Sue did in  (32)  and (33 ) ) .  An example as (34)  certainly requires reference 
to something l ike degrees or standards. 
(34) Al ate a sweeter piece of cake than (what ) was good for his teeth . 
However, let me st.ick to the policy of the previous section and continue to 
compare individuals rather than degrees or standards . Thus restricted , I 
follow the standard assumption that the implicit wll-operator semantical ly 
intro duces an abstraction over a free variable within the denotation of the 
quest ion predicate, i .e .  an abstraction over an individual variable. Then , the 
dpnot.at ion of the entire comparative wh-complement wil l  simply be a set of 
individuals .  For instance , the denotation of the complement than (what) A 1  
a te is a s e t  represented by the  fol lowing logical form.  
( 33 )  /\y . a t.e' ( aL y)  
A set  of individuals i s  exactly what i s  needed as  the second argument of a 
comparative adjective . Since we load all the responsib i l i ty for extablishing a 
part icular comparative relation on the comparative adject ive that ,  in addi­
tion, induces a constraint on a set of comparison instances , we don ' t  have to 
worry about properties of the free variable implicit ly contained in the informa­
tion given by the quest ion predicate when none snch property is predicated.  
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Moreover, it is  questionable whether implicit properties should be assumed 
at al l  when explic it  occur ences of sHch predications yield ungrammatical re­
sults :  
(36) * Sue ate a bigger muffin than Al baked a big scone. 
Relatedly, it has been argued (d. Lerner and Pinkal ( 1 995 , p . 7) )  that the im­
pl ic it  IIOUII in the complement is a one-pronoun that is subject to  an anaphoric 
mechanism similar to One Anaphora. In  contrast to the current proposal that 
the complement denotes a set , their proposal yields a proposit ion for the com­
plement where the free variable is existentially quant i fied . This conclusion , 
however, is not supported by the German data they mention as evidence. 
(37) Sue besitzt einen schnelleren vVagen als Al  einen hat . 
'Sue owns a faster car than Al one has ' (Lerner and Pinkal ' s  (52 ) ) 
(38)  Sue besitzt einen schnelleren Wagen als AI we/ehe hat .  
' Sue owns a faster car than Al some has' 
The one-pronoun in (37) is j ust a special instance of the more general p lural 
pronoun in (38) , which rather supports the view that a set of individuals is 
anaphorically related to some contextually sal ient property. Its resolut ion 
would be guaranteed under recourse to the constraint that it has to  be a 
subset of the comparison set e[N] . 
To summarize ,  I assume that the hypotactic complpment consists of 
two parts , an impl ici t wh-operator and a question prcd icat.e . Taking the 
syntact ic evidence seriously, I propose that the complement has the semantics 
of an indirect question . The assumption t hat the wh-operat or is represented 
as an abstraction over individuals providps us with a respective set that can 
be  identified as the set of comparison instances . 
Providing the complement with a question semant. ics has a further ad­
vantage concerning the problem of quantified NPs and connect ives occurring 
within the complement .  Cons i der the following examples from (Lerner and 
Pinkal 1 995 ) . 
( 39)  George o lV n s  a fast.er car than every pol iceman . 
(40 ) George owns a faster car than Bi l l  and Richard . 
The problems arise wi t. h  the rpadings on which George 's  car is compared ,  i ll 
(39) , to the different cars owned by the different pol icemen and , i n  (40 ) , to 
both Hill 's cars and Richard 's  c:ars .  The less accpssible read ings that involve a 
com parison to, respectively, tl Ie cars co-owned by tllC policemen and the  cars 
co-owned by Bil l  and Ri ch a rd are usually taken to be the unproblemat ic ba­
s ic: case. To acco unt for the problematic read ings ,  for instance , yon Stechow 
( 1 984) refers t .o a non-st.andard scoping mechanism alld Lerner an d Pinkal 
( 1 995) st i  pulate a nOll-standard cant pos i t ioll operat ion of generalized func­
tion application"- Apart from t. h e  fact  that nOll-standard nIPchanisms have 
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to  be assumed, another weakness of these accounts that they analyse the pre­
ferred reading by a derived logical form . However ,  the already questionable 
"basic" reading with an every NP, seems to d isappear when employing  other 
quantifiers : 
( 4 1 )  George owns a faster car than most./few /the three pol icemen . 
A read ing in which George 's  car is said to be faster t.han t.he car (s ) co-owned 
by most, few or the three pol icemen is very unl ikely. For a solution of the 
problems wi thin t.he current. analys is of the semantics of the complement , 
we may appeal to the standard observation that quantifiers ocuning in t.he 
question predicate of indirect questions induce functional readings (cf . Groe­
nendij k and Stokhof ( 1 982) and Engdah l ( 1 986) ) .  Skipp ing the details of the 
exact composition of a funct. ional wh-complement , its representat ion will  be 
roughly as  fol lows . 
( 42)  ),f'ylx [policernan' (x )  ---+ own' (:l: ,  f (:r ) ) ]  
Here,  it i s  asked for a function f such that each po l iceman owns someth i ng 
that is the value of f wit.h respect. to h imse l f. The denotat ion of f (x)  is 
a set of t.hings owned by x . Thus , the denotatioll of (42)  wil l  be a set of 
set of things owned by the individual policemen .  Each of the sets given by 
f serves as a possible set of compar ison instances which has to be a subset 
of t he comparison set . The p rob lem of connectives within complement.s is  
accounted for analogously. 
I add two final remarks .  The ana ly:;is of the hypot.act ic comp leme llt 
as an ind irect. question also n icely accounts for t.he  fact that negative polarity 
item occurrences in t.he comp lement are l icensed . Since questions generally 
are negati ve po larity environments with the respect ive monoton icity proper­
tie:;, I take this  as further support for the indirect quest ion analysis of the 
complement .  See (Hoeksema 1 98.3) for a d i scussion of the compara tive as a 
negat ive polarity environment . Second ,  the charact.erization of the compari­
son instance as a set of possibly more t h a n  a single element accounts for Lerner 
and P inka l 's ( 1 995) observatiol l  t.hat the comparison inst.ance i s  not anaphor­
ieally accessible from the discourse follow ing t.he comparat ive sentence , si nce 
an aphora relate to an individual ,  not a set .  
Let. ' s  turn t o  paratact ic complement.s . An examp le for a comparative 
with a para tact ic  complement is (43) . 
(43) Al ordered a bigger piece of cake than t. h e  olle/anyone on displ ay. 
In cont.rast to hypot.act ic comparat ives where the complement i s  c:lausal , the 
complement of paratact ic com paratives , on t.h e  surface,  only consists of the 
complement marker than and a plain NP const i t.uent . :vly proposal for the 
semantics of para tactic  comp lements is actua l ly qu ite simp le . Since the  COIIl­
parative adject ive requ i res a comparison i nstance or, more general ly, a set. 
of compar ison instances , I t ake the comp leme llt constituent to denote the 
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instance or, respectively, the set (as above , we might assume a general set 
forming mechanism for the complement) .  Support for this view can be drawn 
from the observation that individual denoting expression l ike proper . names 
or singular definite descriptions and expressions denoting (maximal) sets like 
any-NPs or plural definite descriptions are preferred in  paratactic comple­
ments while other NPs appear much less acceptable .  
(44 )  ?? Al ordered a bigger piece of cake than three/most/few pieces . 
As a consequence of the direct analysis for the paratactic complement , i . e .  
that the  analysis does no t  assume an  implicit wh-operator , we  are deprived 
of the indirect question as a negative polarity environment . In this  respect ,  
there has been some dispute about any-NPs being negative polarity items 
(NPls) . I think,  however, that we have good motivation for a free choice any 
analysis .  The predicative comparative in (45) has been used as support for a 
NPI-any analysis (Klein 1 991 , ex . ( 1 27b) ) .  It is claimed that both N PIs have 
to be l icensed by the comparative as a negative environment. 
(45)  Sue is taller than any boy that I eve.,. met . 
However, observations about negative islands show that an N P I  in a relative 
clause cannot be l icensed by an operator outside the scope of the N P  (see 
Ladusaw ( 1 996) for an overview) . I take it that e ver is licensed because it 
occurs in the restriction of a universal , i . e .  the free choice any . 
The analysis of paratactic complements may be somewhat cursory. A 
detailed examination of the different kinds of NPs is certainly desirable as 
would be a unified analysis for both paratactic and hypotactic comparatives . 
Such an analysis probably has to make reference to degrees or standards , 
which I decided to avoid . It has been shown that hypotactic comparatives 
semantically analysed as indirect questions proves useful in the explanation 
of a variety of problems. Furthermore, I t ake the above as good evidence that 
comparatives involve both a comparison instance, which may be  a set ,  and 
a contextually available comparison set . I argued that they have to be kept 
apart . We exploit their characterization in the following. 
6 .  The analysis o f  t h e  DE i n  comparat ives 
Consider again our original observation about the DE in complement less com­
paratives. 
(7 )  Of t hose cars, Sue b o u g h t.  one .  George bought every faster car .  
( 8 )  Sue bought a car . # George bought every faster c a r.  
(9 )  Sue bought a car. George b ought a faster car .  
Exploiting the characterization of comparison instance and comparison set , 
the explanation of the contrast in acceptability between (7)  and ( 8 )  runs as 
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fol lows. The interpretation of every faster car in ( 7) depends on a compar­
ison set c [car' ] in its domain .  Since the sentence preceding the comparative 
provides a context in which the contextually available cars are restricted to 
a specific set  of cars , the domain presupposition of the strong comparative 
NP can be satisfied . The co-intersective quantifier ranges over elements of the 
definite comparison set rather than anything which is a car. Having identified 
the comparison instance , i . e .  the car Sue bought , a truth value for the com­
parative sentence can be computed. Contrastingly in  (8) , there is  no definite 
comparison set the comparison instance is taken from. The constraint that 
the comparison instance has to be a subset of some comparison set allows 
for a variety of instantiations. However ,  since the domain presupposition for 
strong quantifiers requires a definite domain ,  the comparative sentence is sub­
ject to a presupposition fai lure .  For (9 ) , it is only required that both Sue 's  car 
and George 's  car be clements of some comparison set regardless of its  exact 
definition . The indefinite comparative NP does not presuppose its domain 
and ,  thus ,  does not require a definite comparison set . 
Regarding the DE in comparat ives with complements, the above ex­
planation in terms of presupposition failure applies analogously. If no definite 
comparison set can be found , this results in a presupposition fai lure when 
strong comparative NPs are involved in the comparative. However, there are 
some puzzling differences between paratactic and hypotactic complements 
which are not entirely clear to me yet . Consider the ell iptical (46) , which 
is ambiguous between the paraphrased paratactic and hypotactic resolution 
of the ell iptical complement whereas (47) does not seem to give rise to  the 
respective ambiguity. ( I  chose contesta,n ts as the noun of the comparative 
NP to suggest that there is a definite comparison set-the participants in a 
certain contest usually determine such a definite set . ) 
(46)  Sue defeated a stronger contestant than A I .  
a .  'Sue defeated a stronger contestant than how strong Al  is . ' 
b .  'Sue defeated a stronger contestant than what contestants Al did . '  
(47) Sue defeated every st ronger contestant than A I .  
a .  ' Sue defeated every stronger contestant than how strong Al is . ' 
btf ' Sue d efeated every stronger contestant tha.n what contesta.nts AI  d id . '  
Under t h e  assumption that contestant provides a definite comparison set , n o  
d i fference i n  acceptability between t h e  paratactic reading o f  (47)  a n d  its hy­
potactic reading is expected accord ing to the above explanation of the DE.  
Kevertheless, the hypotactic reading seems t o  be distinctly less admissible 
than the paratactic reading. An account for this difference may be found 
in the different semantics of the respective complements rather than being 
related to the DE. \Nhi le the paratactic complement is always interpreted 
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as definite ( individual or set ) , the question semantics of the hypotactic com­
plement yields an unspecific com parisi on instance .  It may be our lack of 
knowledge about the comparison instance, that precludes the reading with a 
hypotactic complement . It cannot be decided who Sue defeated when it is 
not known who exactly Al defeated . There are no such l imitations for the 
readings in  (46 )  with a weak comparat ive ;.;rP. 
Another issue regarding complemented r.omparatives that I haVf� to 
leave to further investigation concerns accommodation of the comparison set . 
Let me j ust give a rough idea of what is at stake. Note that (48)  is not as 
hope less as (49 ) .  
(48)  Al ate t h e  bigger piece o f  cake than Sue .  
(49) # Al  ate the bigger piece of cake than every student . 
Suppose that everyone had j ust one piece of cake . In (48)  it is possible to 
accommodate a comparison set of exactly two pieces of cake consisting of the 
one eaten by Al  and the other eaten by Sue .  With this comparison set at our 
disposit ion ,  the uniqueness condit ion imposed by the definite comparative NP 
is  sat isfied .  For (49) , it  is not  possible to accommodate a definite comparison 
set i n  a similar fashion. Since the complement provides us with a range of 
possible comparison instances, i .e .  a single piece or a set of pieces for each 
student , there would be a range of possible comparison sets. Each one of 
those would contain the piece of cake eaten by Al and the one eaten by some 
student . 
7 .  A note on comparative ellipsis 
The analysis of the complement i n  sect ion 5. confines me to a particular 
view about the resolut ion of comparative el l ipsis . First ,  paratactic comple­
ments cannot  be an instance of comparat ive e l l i psis .  Since the interpretat ion 
of the const ituent within the parat actic complement directly establishes the  
comparison instance , no resolut ion of any additional information i s  required . 
Regard ing hypotac t ic  complement s ,  I need an account of how the question 
predicate m ay be completed , i .e .  how the  m issing information m ay be re­
tr ieved from the previous contex t .  O n  the surface ,  an el l iptical complement 
may appear in two different guises . VP el l ipsis contains an overt occurrence 
of an auxi l iary or modal verb . B are remnant el l ips is only involves one or more 
constituent occurrences without a verb .  I follow a widely accepted assu mp­
tion that resolution takes place on some level uf logical form . Fur thermore , 
I assume that some sort of anaphoric mech an ism is responsible for el l ipsis 
resolut ion . The auxi l iary in VP el l ipsis supplies an overt an aphoric element 
whereas an implicit one is demanded in bare remnant el l ipsis .  The logical  form 
of the com plement contains an  impl ic i t  relation that i s  anaphorical ly related 
t o  an antecedent . The arity of the i m p l i c i t  relation will be  ful ly determined 
by the overt material in  the ell ipsis together with the requirement of a free 
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variable in the question predicate to be bound by the implicit wh-operator. 
Necessitated by the question semantics of the complement , the relation i s  at 
least unary. An example for a missing property is the following bare remnant 
complement ,  where the resolved question predicate may be paraphrased as 
what Sue had yesterday . 
(50)  Sue had a bigger piece of cake than yesterday. 
The assumption of al l  anaphoric relation with flexible arity avoids the prob­
lems of an analysis of el l iptical comparatives as some sort of antecedent con­
tained deletion .  Specifically, it cannot be motivated that the resolution of 
e.g. (50) forces scoping of the comparative NP as predicted in main stream 
analyses of antecedent contained deletion (cf. Lerner and Pinkal ( 1 995) for 
further details ) . I argued elsewhere (Beil 1 996) that antecedent contained 
deletion can also be analysed as involving a flexible relation . 
8 .  Open ends 
Since the paper aimed at an explanation of the DE in  comparat.ives, the 
attention was restricted to attribut ive comparatives in t.heir various forms. 
This restriction motivated the somewhat problematic decisioll to relate only 
individuals in a comparative relation.  I think, though ,  this decision does not 
diminish the results concerning the DE. Of course , i t  remains to  be shown 
how the analysis can be embedded in an account for comparatives in general . 
A generalization of the account for the hypotactic complement analysed as 
an indirect question may prove useful here . To my knowledge , the indirect 
question analysis of comparative complements has not been illvest igated from 
a semantic point of view.  I mentioned that the analysis may show more 
merits with respect to further semantic problems posed by the complement. . 
( i ) The complement is a negative polarity environmellt .  ( i i ) The comparison 
instance is anaphorically inaccessible. In  addit ion ,  ( i i i ) a clausal negation 
in the complement is anomalous (Sue bougil t  a faster car than Al didn 't) . 
Hopeful ly, further research wil l  yield posit ive results .  
Endnotes 
* I am grateful to Cleo Condoravdi ,  Tim Fernando,  Antj e  Rossdeutscher 
and Carl Vogel for their help .  
1 I cal l  the th ing or th ings which the item of comparisoll is  compared to the 
cOlnparison instance. In  a comparative clause with cOll lplement. ,  th e compar­
ison instance is given with the complement . 
2 Since I wi l l  Hot be concerned i n  the fol lowing with specific problems related 
to presupposition projection behaviour of complex determiners , I confine my­
self to J\!Ioltmann 's  i n formal characterization of domain presupposit ion and 
refer the reader to her paper for the formalization . 
3 A more cautiolls forrnulat ioll might be preferred : let the comparison class 
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be a set of individuals that participate in an event of the same type ;  the ele­
ments do not necessarily have to be  assigned to the same thematic role as in 
the original event . 
4 I think that Moltmann ' s  explanation stops short here . The problem is 
not that the free variable cannot be evaluated but that a given context may 
provide several possible specifications of e via different variable assignment 
functions. ( In dynamic semantics , a context is often charact.erized as a set of 
assignments . )  This results in a different comparison set for different specifi­
cations. Because of that ,  the domain presupposition cannot be satisfied . 
5 Although Lerner and Pinkal ( 1 995)  argue that their operation is logically 
harmless since it can be defined in terms of plain function application,  I conjec­
ture that there are serious problems i f  one allows for unrestricted application 
in the composition .  For instance, its application in the composition of a sub­
ject NP and a transitive verb wi l l  have fatal results .  Moreover ,  i t  is not shown 
that the operation is of  use for other constructions than for comparatives . 
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